Four million pounds by Monday
In November 1875 the British prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, learned that the Khedive of Egypt, Ismail Pasha, was looking for a buyer for his shares in the Suez Canal Company. The canal had opened in 1869, built by a French company under Ferdinand de Lesseps, and it had quickly become the main route between Britain and India. Ismail, who owned a large minority holding in the company, was close to bankruptcy, and French financiers were negotiating to buy them.[1][2]
Disraeli wanted the shares for Britain, and he wanted them before the French could act. Parliament was not sitting, so there was no immediate way to vote the money, and the Bank of England could not lend to the government without parliamentary authority. He turned to Lionel de Rothschild. The London house agreed to advance £4 million, an enormous sum at the time, so that the government could buy the Khedive’s 176,602 shares at once and seek Parliament’s approval afterwards.[1][3]
The Rothschilds charged a commission of 2.5 per cent, and the government repaid the advance in about three months, early in 1876. Some members of Parliament attacked the commission as excessive for a loan that carried so little risk. Others pointed out that the Rothschilds had committed a very large sum at a moment’s notice without any guarantee that Parliament would approve the purchase.[1][4] The Rothschild Archive holds the receipts for the instalments paid to the Egyptian government in December 1875 and early 1876, which show that much of the money went straight to the Khedive’s other creditors.[3][2]
A famous anecdote has Disraeli’s secretary, Montagu Corry, calling on Lionel at New Court, where the banker, eating grapes, asked what security the government offered and, on being told that it was the British government itself, agreed on the spot. The story was told long after the event and cannot be checked against the documents; it belongs with the legends rather than the record.[4] Disraeli’s own letter to Queen Victoria announcing the purchase, with its much-quoted line “you have it, Madam”, is the best-known document of the affair.[2]
The debate of February 1876
The bargain had to be explained to Parliament when it met in February 1876, and the debates in the House of Commons give the most exact public account of the transaction. On 14 February the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, asked the House to vote £4,080,000. He explained that the Khedive’s holding had been supposed to be 177,642 shares but, because Ismail had sold some, turned out to be 176,602, so that the price had been reduced to £3,976,582. The Rothschilds had undertaken to pay that sum to the Khedive, and “in consideration of their trouble and risk” the government would pay them 2½ per cent, “or £99,414”. The Khedive was to pay Britain £200,000 a year as interest on the purchase money, and Northcote hoped that the shares would in time pay for themselves.[5]
The opposition attacked the price of the Rothschild money rather than the purchase itself. Disraeli had told the House on the first night of the session, “We asked the house of Rothschild to purchase those shares on our engagement to ask the House of Commons to take them off their hands. It was a great risk.” In the adjourned debate on 21 February the former Chancellor Robert Lowe denied that there had been any risk at all, since Parliament could not in honour have refused to pay. He contrasted the arrangement with his own experience of paying £3,200,000 to the United States, when the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England had found a way of paying in gold that, far from costing the government anything, “actually saved £5,000”.[6]
The debate also exposed a muddle over the terms. The Rothschilds’ own letter stated, “It is also understood that we are to charge Her Majesty’s Government a commission of 2½ per cent upon the £4,000,000, and 5 per cent interest per annum until the date of repayment”, while the Treasury Minute provided for them to receive the 5 per cent interest from the Khedive. One member reckoned the difference at about £37,000, which had not appeared in the vote.[6]
Gladstone made the sharpest calculation. He did not blame the Rothschilds, who were “liable to no blame”, and he accepted that the country was bound to pay them in full; but if “three months was the time during which Messrs. Rothschild were out of £4,000,000”, then 2½ per cent was the equivalent of 10 per cent a year, and with the 5 per cent interest the government had in effect paid 15 per cent a year for the use of the money. That, he argued, was a poor price for British credit.[6]
Disraeli replied that the alternatives were illusory. It was “against the law of this country for the Bank to advance a sum of money to the Ministry”, and the Bank could not have bought the shares without consulting its lawyers and calling a public court, by which time the chance would have gone. To the charge that the Rothschilds’ clerks had gambled on the news, he answered, “my belief is that the Messrs. Rothschild kept the secret as well as Her Majesty’s Government”, and he blamed the speculation instead on “a telegram from Grand Cairo” that had reached the Stock Exchange as soon as the offer was accepted. The vote was agreed to that night.[6] Both sides had a point. The commission was generous for three months’ use of money, but no other lender in London could have found £4 million in days, in secret, without first asking Parliament.
Egypt after Suez
The Suez purchase drew the Rothschilds into the finances of Egypt, a country in which they had had no previous involvement. Caroline Shaw of the Rothschild Archive has traced what followed through the bank’s own files. Ismail’s borrowing had been reckless, and Egypt’s largely agricultural population, she writes, bore “a tremendous burden of taxation”. In 1878, with the country on the verge of bankruptcy, the Khedive was forced to accept British and French ministers in his government, and the new finance minister, Charles Rivers Wilson, asked Lionel for a loan secured on the vast estates of the Khedive and his family.[2]
The London and Paris houses issued the bonds jointly in February 1879, and the loan was a source of trouble from the start. Many of the estates turned out to be already mortgaged; bondholders demanded their money back; and the bank withheld the proceeds until the courts had settled the disputes, to Rivers Wilson’s despair. Lionel died in June 1879, and a letter of condolence remarked that the Egyptian loan had been one of his last pieces of business and expressed the hope that it would not prove the worst. The estates were placed under a commission of British, French and Egyptian representatives, and the letters of the British commissioner, Francis Rowsell, give a vivid picture of the confusion he found: no maps, no accounts, conscripted labour and falling crop prices.[2]
Egypt’s debts became one of the causes of the British occupation of 1882, and historians have argued ever since about how far financial interests drove imperial expansion. The Rothschild files show bankers who were deeply involved in the politics of Egyptian debt and well informed about it, but also anxious, reactive and often frustrated, rather than the masterminds that critics of “finance imperialism” imagined.[2][4]
The world’s bankers
Suez was the most famous Rothschild operation of the second half of the century, but it was one among many. After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, Alphonse de Rothschild, James’s eldest son and head of the Paris house, led the syndicates that raised the huge loans of 1871 and 1872 with which France paid its indemnity of five billion francs to the new German Empire, so ending the German occupation of French territory sooner than anyone had expected. For the first two billion the government turned almost exclusively to Rothschild and its partners, Hottinguer, Mallet, Fould and others, and bought a guarantee for half the loan from the house in return for generous commissions.[7][8] The London house, which had raised loans for Brazil since the 1820s, went on lending to governments across Latin America.[9][4] In 1887 it backed Cecil Rhodes in the amalgamation of the Kimberley diamond mines that produced De Beers Consolidated the following year, and in the late 1880s the family became a significant minority shareholder in the Rio Tinto copper mines in Spain.[10][11] In Paris, Alphonse and his brothers bought into Russian oil: from 1886 the Caspian and Black Sea Petroleum Company, known by its Russian initials as BNITO, gave Baku crude an outlet to the Black Sea and became the most serious rival of the Nobel brothers.[12][13]
In the United States the family worked through an agent rather than a branch. August Belmont, born in Alzey in Hesse, had begun as an apprentice in the Frankfurt house and served the Rothschilds in Naples before he was sent to Havana in 1837 and then to New York. There he founded his own firm, August Belmont & Co., which represented the Rothschilds in America until the early twentieth century. Belmont became a power in the Democratic Party and in New York society.[14] The decision not to open an American house, which in retrospect looks like one of the family’s great mistakes, reflected the partners’ conviction that only a member of the family could be trusted to run a Rothschild bank.
By then that conviction was becoming a weakness. The Naples house closed in 1863, after Italian unification left it without its royal patrons, and Carl’s son Adolph returned to Frankfurt. The Frankfurt house closed in 1901, after the death of Wilhelm Carl, the last male Rothschild there, because there was no son to take it over.[8][15] The family that had once had five houses now had three, in London, Paris and Vienna, and the joint-stock banks of Germany, Britain and the United States were growing far larger than any private partnership. The Rothschilds remained immensely rich and respected, but they were no longer, as they had been in 1830, without equal.
References
OpenClose
- The Rothschild Archive, “Lionel de Rothschild and the Suez Canal” *
- Caroline Shaw, “Egyptian finances in the nineteenth century. A Rothschild perspective,” The Rothschild Archive Review of the Year (2006) *
- The Rothschild Archive, “Archivist’s choice. Suez Canal loan receipts, 1876” (March 2015) *
- Niall Ferguson, The House of Rothschild. Volume 2, The World’s Banker 1849–1999 (London: Penguin, 2000; first published 1999) *
- Hansard, House of Commons, “Supply. The Suez Canal Shares,” 14 February 1876, vol. 227 *
- Hansard, House of Commons, “Supply. £4,080,000, Suez Canal Shares. Resolution, adjourned debate,” 21 February 1876, vol. 227 *
- Comité Carnot, Cahier 2, “Les grands emprunts de 1871 et 1872 pour le paiement des cinq milliards d’indemnités de guerre” *
- Henry Wasserman, Simon R. Schwarzfuchs and Vivian David Lipman, “Rothschild,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., reprinted at Encyclopedia.com *
- Victor Gray and Melanie Aspey (eds.), “Nathan Mayer Rothschild. A chronology,” in The Life and Times of N M Rothschild 1777–1836 (London, 1998) *
- EBSCO Research Starters, “Rhodes Amalgamates Kimberley Diamondfields” *
- EBSCO Research Starters, “Rio Tinto” *
- “L’installation de la banque Rothschild en Russie de 1883 à 1886,” École nationale des chartes, positions de thèses *
- Jennifer Siegel, “The Transnational Origins of the Russian Oil Industry. The Rothschilds, BNITO and Baku Naphtha,” Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University *
- “Belmont, August,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., reprinted at Encyclopedia.com *
- The Rothschild Archive, “Rothschild timeline” *
The family tree, timeline, places, glossary and select bibliography for the whole history are on the Rothschild index page.