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The Sassoons and opium

How the trade was won

The Sassoons did not invent the opium trade. By the time Elias reached Canton in 1844, British, American, Parsi and other merchants had been shipping Indian opium to China for decades. What the Sassoons did, between the 1840s and the 1880s, was take over a large part of it. Hunt, summarising Joseph Sassoon’s research, lists “cornering the opium market” as one of the four planks of the family’s rise, and notes that by 1860 opium was the world’s most valuable traded commodity.[1] Joseph Sassoon’s own summary of the decades after 1864 is that both Sassoon firms traded in many goods, but that until the end of the century cotton and opium dominated their transactions. In his phrase, this was “helping Britain’s policy to export opium to China to balance its imports of silk and tea.”[2] Profits from opium, the Times of Israel records from his book, carried the business forward especially strongly in the three decades after 1860.[3]

Exact figures for the Sassoons’ share of the trade are hard to establish, and published estimates vary widely. At one end is the Shanghai Star’s one-fifth of all the opium shipped into China. At the other is a claim, repeated in the Literary Review’s notice of Peter Stansky’s biography of Philip and Sybil Sassoon, that the Sassoons “owned 70 per cent” of the Indian opium business, from which a seventh of Britain’s income from India was said to derive.[4][5] Neither figure comes with a source that can be checked, and both should be read as indications of reputation rather than measurements. Writing in Scroll.in, Ajay Kamalakaran quotes a 2001 article in the Shanghai Star: “About one-fifth of all opium brought into China was shipped on the Sassoon fleet.”[4] The Jewish Encyclopedia, written in 1906 while the trade was still running, states flatly that David Sassoon’s business “included a monopoly of the opium-trade.” That is an exaggeration, but it shows how dominant the firm appeared to contemporaries.[6] Whatever the precise share, the method was clear. Patel describes a firm that integrated vertically. It bought the steamships that carried the opium, went into marine insurance to protect its investment in those ships and sat on the boards of the banks that financed “the whole juggernaut.”[7] The family also had something the big British houses lacked: partners who were brothers, posted at both ends of the route.

The family’s commercial advantage was therefore not only a matter of capital. It rested on information that travelled faster than competitors’ information, carried by telegraph and private letters in a language rivals could not read. It also rested on agents who were sons and cousins, and on a willingness to hold stock and wait for the market. Patel notes that while most accounts of Bombay’s opium trade end in the 1850s, “for the Sassoons … the 1850s were just the starting point.” For the rest of the century, he writes, they “rode high on burgeoning opium profits.”[7]

A poppy on the crest

How did the family regard this business? The most striking evidence is heraldic. Abdullah, the eldest son, later Sir Albert, commissioned a family crest that featured, as Patel puts it, “a bulging poppy.”[7] The motto was Candide et Constanter, and above it was a line of Hebrew script.[2] The poppy was not hidden or disguised. It was displayed on the arms of a family that had been made baronets for its public services, in the reign of a Queen whose government had fought two wars to keep the China market open.

Joseph Sassoon worked through the family’s surviving business letters. Patel reports that he “found no evidence in the archives of any family misgivings about the opium trade.”[7] The Jewish Women’s Archive, discussing Flora Sassoon, who ran the Bombay office in the 1890s, makes the same point from the other side. Like the rest of the family, it says, she saw opium “as simply a legal commodity, traded between India and China, subject to the laws of supply and demand, and not as a moral or religious issue.” The family, it adds, “did not see the partners as ‘drug lords.’”[8] Patel goes further. He says there were always claims that opium was harmless and even improved mental ability, “claims which the Sassoon firm embraced, regardless of their veracity.”[7]

The family’s philanthropy and its business ran in parallel without any sense, in the surviving record, that the second might compromise the first. The same letters that arranged opium shipments arranged gifts to synagogues and schools, and David Sassoon’s tithe was paid out of profits that came largely from opium.

Lobbying and the long ending

The trade had critics from the start, in China, in India and in Britain. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, as Patel puts it, “a storm of moral revulsion towards the opium trade gathered force in Europe and India.”[7] British parliamentary resolutions against the trade were introduced repeatedly between 1875 and 1890, while parishes and church convocations held meetings and sent mass petitions in their support.[9] The Sassoons fought back. Patel writes that Albert’s generation “vigorously lobbied against anti-opium activists.”[7] The Times of Israel records that the family managed for years to fend off the political and religious pressure in Britain to ban what its opponents called the “evil trade.”[3]

The end came through diplomacy. In 1906 the Liberals, who had long opposed the opium trade on moral grounds, came to power in Britain. The same year the Qing government issued an edict setting out a ten-year programme to reduce both opium production and consumption in China.[9] A bilateral agreement followed, committing Britain to phase out its opium exports to China between January 1908 and the end of 1917. Exports were to fall by ten per cent a year, provided China cut domestic cultivation at the same rate, and British officials won the right to verify Chinese reductions.[9] Kamalakaran calls it the Ten Years’ Agreement.[4] In February 1909 the first international conference on narcotics, the International Opium Commission, met in Shanghai, the city where both Sassoon firms had major offices.[9]

The Sassoons did not leave the trade when the agreement was signed. According to the Times of Israel’s account of Joseph Sassoon’s book, the writing was on the wall by 1907, and six years later Britain “further tightened the screw.” Even so, both Sassoon companies continued trading the drug, “attempting to squeeze every last penny from the now-discredited trade.”[3] Patel notes that Joseph Sassoon shows the Indian opium trade to East Asia “alive and kicking as late as the 1920s, several years after the British and Chinese governments agreed to halt it.”[7] Joseph Sassoon’s own verdict is that the family’s British branch was “too slow to move the family business away from the opium trade.”[2]

Westminster and the last stocks

The parliamentary campaign reached its height just as the trade was ending. On 30 May 1906, in the first session after the Liberal landslide, Theodore Taylor, the member for Radcliffe in Lancashire, moved a motion that reaffirmed “the conviction of the House that the Indo-Chinese opium trade was morally indefensible” and asked the government to bring it to “a speedy close.” He told the House that the subject had not been debated there for eleven years. After a long reply from Morley for the government, the motion was agreed to without a division.[10] Sir Henry Cotton told the House that educated opinion in India was strongly opposed to the trade.[10]

Seven years later the argument had moved on to who would bear the losses. On 7 May 1913 the Welsh member Towyn Jones, in his maiden speech, moved that China be released from its treaty obligation to admit Indian opium and be left free to prohibit “the stocks of Opium now accumulated at the treaty ports and Hong Kong.” He reminded the House that in 1907 the British minister in Peking, Sir John Jordan, had estimated that only one-seventh of the opium consumed in China came from India. The Indian government, he said, had calculated that on a ten-year average 51,000 of the 67,000 chests India produced each year went to China. By the middle of 1910, he claimed, China had cut its own production by 70 to 80 per cent, and the price of the drug had risen fourfold.[11]

The stocks were the merchants’ problem. Towyn Jones said that “the opium merchants of Shanghai and Hong Kong,” believing that China could not carry out its policy, had built up stocks valued at ten or twelve million pounds, on which British and other banks had advanced between four and five million. Edmund Harvey, seconding him, said that the merchants had at one time valued the stock at over £10,000,000, while others put it at £4,000,000 or less. If there had to be a loss, he asked, was it better that it fall on “the purses of a few” or on the lives of a great number? Leslie Scott, defending the merchants, put the January stocks at 27,500 cases worth about £8,000,000. He argued that the trade had been carried on at the invitation of the government of India and with the sanction of the government in London.[11] None of the speakers named a firm. But both Sassoon houses were still dealing in the drug in these years, and the stocks in the godowns of Shanghai and Hong Kong were the last of the trade on which the family fortune had been built.[3][11]

Weighing the record

Two arguments run through modern writing on the subject, and both deserve to be set out. The first is contextual. Joseph Sassoon warns against judging the family only through a modern moral lens. Opium was legal, it was sold as a painkiller in pharmacies and its price was quoted in the financial press. The Sassoons operated within a trade that the British state had organised, fought for and taxed.[3] Within the terms of their time, they were merchants doing lawfully what the largest firms of the empire did.

The second argument is that those terms were contested in the family’s own lifetime, by Chinese officials, missionaries, Indian critics and British reformers, and that the family was well aware of the opposition, since it lobbied against it. On this view the Sassoons were not merely carriers of a commodity but among the largest beneficiaries of a trade imposed on China by force. Their lobbying helped to prolong it. Joseph Sassoon himself does not spare them. He concludes that they should have “dropped out” of the dying trade long before they did, for business reasons as well as moral ones, and he calls their decision to keep “hanging around until the last box” was sold “squalid.”[3]

There is also a third point, about memory. Patel observes that what is most noteworthy is how completely later generations forgot the family’s connection with the drug: “once the drug ceased to be profitable, their children took recourse to historical amnesia.”[7] When the Jewish Museum in New York mounted an exhibition on the family in 2023, one critic complained that it had “missed an opportunity to look more critically at the family’s opium trade.”[12] This history tries not to repeat that omission. Opium was not an embarrassing footnote to the Sassoons’ success. It was, for half a century, its foundation.

References

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