A visit to New York
In September 1938 Harry Oppenheimer, then twenty-nine, travelled from Johannesburg to New York to meet Gerold M. Lauck, the president of N. W. Ayer, one of the leading advertising agencies in the United States. The agency had been recommended to him by the Morgan bank, which had helped his father in 1917 and remained close to the family. The bankers were worried about the price of diamonds, which had declined around the world. This account of the meeting, and of the long campaign that followed, comes from the American writer Edward Jay Epstein, who in 1982 published a long investigation of the diamond trade in the Atlantic Monthly drawing on Ayer’s own strategy papers. Epstein was a critic of the cartel, and his interpretations are his own; the quotations below are from the agency papers as he reported them.[1]

The commercial logic was simple. In Europe, where diamond prices had collapsed during the depression, there seemed little prospect of restoring public confidence. In Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain the custom of a diamond engagement ring had never taken hold, and in Britain and France diamonds were still thought of as jewels for aristocrats. Europe, moreover, was on the verge of war. That left the United States, where, according to Epstein, some three-quarters of the cartel’s diamonds were then being sold for engagement rings. Most of those stones were small and of modest quality, with an average price of eighty dollars. Harry and the bankers believed that advertising could persuade Americans to buy larger and more expensive ones.[1]
The Ayer plan
Harry proposed that Ayer prepare a plan for creating a new image for diamonds in America. He assured Lauck that De Beers had approached no other American agency, offered Ayer the exclusive placement of newspaper and radio advertising if the plan met with his father’s approval, and agreed to pay for the research needed to develop it. Lauck accepted at once. The agency’s researchers found that since 1919 the quantity of diamonds sold in America, measured in carats, had fallen by half, and that the quality had fallen even further. An Ayer memorandum blamed the economy, changes in social attitudes and the promotion of competitive luxuries.[1]
Ayer could do nothing about the economy, but it proposed to change the social attitudes. Its study stressed the need to strengthen in the public mind the association of diamonds with romance. Since, it noted, young men bought over ninety per cent of all engagement rings, it would be crucial to persuade them that a diamond was a gift of love, and that the larger and finer the diamond, the greater the love it expressed. Young women, in turn, were to be encouraged to see diamonds as an integral part of courtship. The campaign was meant to sell diamonds in general rather than any particular brand or shop.[1]
Film stars and princesses
The agency turned first to the cinema. Film stars, the paragons of romance for the mass audience, would be given diamonds to use as symbols of indestructible love. Stories and society photographs would be offered to magazines and newspapers, stressing the size of the diamonds that celebrities gave to the women they loved. Fashion designers would speak on the radio about a trend towards diamonds that Ayer itself planned to start. An Ayer memorandum even suggested that the British royal family, given Britain’s important interest in the diamond industry, could be of tremendous assistance by wearing diamonds rather than other jewels. Epstein noted that Queen Elizabeth later made a well-publicised visit to South African diamond mines and accepted a diamond from Oppenheimer.[1]
At the other end of the market, Ayer placed lush colour advertisements in magazines read by opinion-formers, illustrated with reproductions of paintings by Picasso, Derain, Dalí and Dufy, to suggest that diamonds, like paintings, were unique works of art. By 1941 the agency could report to its client that diamond sales in the United States had risen by fifty-five per cent since 1938, reversing the long decline. It claimed to have invented a new form of advertising, in which there was no direct sale to be made and no brand name to be impressed on the public mind, only an idea: the eternal emotional value surrounding the diamond. A timeline published by News24 dates the first De Beers campaign, in the Reader’s Digest, to 1939.[1][2]
Forever
Ayer’s strategy paper for 1947 was frank about its method. “We are dealing with a problem in mass psychology,” it said. The aim was to strengthen the tradition of the diamond engagement ring, to make it a psychological necessity capable of competing at the retail level with utility goods and services. The agency arranged for lecturers to visit American high schools, where their talks revolved around the engagement ring. In 1946 it had set up a weekly service called “Hollywood Personalities”, which supplied leading newspapers with descriptions of the diamonds worn by film stars.[1]
Then it found its words. An Ayer copywriter, Epstein wrote, came up with the line “A Diamond Is Forever”, scrawled beneath a picture of two young lovers on honeymoon. Within a year it had become the official motto of De Beers. Epstein did not name the writer. She was Frances Gerety, a young copywriter at N. W. Ayer who had worked on the De Beers account since 1942. She suggested the line at a routine meeting in 1947, to the scepticism of her male colleagues, who thought it meant nothing and was not even grammatical. It first appeared in an advertisement in 1948, the year Harry entered Parliament, and it has appeared in every De Beers engagement advertisement since. The phrase did something no advertisement had done before. It sold not merely a stone but the idea that the stone should never be sold again, and it discouraged the resale market that, in Epstein’s view, would otherwise have exposed how little most diamonds were worth once bought.[1][2][3]
Necessity and surprise
Through the 1950s Ayer kept up the pressure. It released engagement-ring stories to the women’s pages, arranged for actresses to wear diamonds on television, and set up a Diamond Information Center whose name lent an air of authority to the news it issued. Its reports quoted Thorstein Veblen on conspicuous consumption and proposed presenting the diamond as an expression of a man’s success in life, with advertisements that should have, in the agency’s phrase, the aroma of tweed, old leather and polished wood. By the end of the decade the agency reported that a whole new generation had grown to marriageable age since 1939, and that to this generation a diamond ring was considered a necessity by virtually everyone.[1]
From the mid-1960s the campaign went abroad. De Beers brought in the J. Walter Thompson agency to work in Japan, Germany and Brazil. In Japan, where marriages had traditionally been arranged and there was no custom of an engagement ring, the agency’s advertisements showed Western-looking women wearing diamonds while hiking, sailing or climbing mountains. When the campaign began in 1967, Epstein wrote, not quite five per cent of engaged Japanese women received a diamond ring; by 1981 some sixty per cent of brides wore one, and Japan had become the second largest market for engagement rings after the United States.[1]
Small stones from Siberia
The campaigns also had to absorb diamonds from a new and awkward source. In the late 1950s Soviet geologists found diamond mines in Siberia, and by the 1960s their output was entering the market. Harry, as Epstein put it, offered the Soviet Union a single channel for controlling the world supply, which the Soviets accepted, so becoming partners in the cartel. Most of their stones were very small, and Ayer was told to reverse its own message: instead of equating love with size, it was now to stress quality, colour and cut, and to give diamonds as small as a tenth of a carat the same emotional importance as large ones. In 1962 the agency had already sought approval for a campaign to make the diamond the only appropriate gift for later-in-life occasions. The eternity ring, set with many tiny stones, was sold to older married women as a token of recaptured love.[1]
Safe hands
The success of the campaign carried its own danger. Every diamond ever cut, Epstein observed, still existed and was in the public’s hands; he cited an estimate that the public held more than five hundred million carats of gem diamonds, many times the cartel’s annual production. If any significant part of that hoard came back onto the market, the price could not be held. In its strategy for 1953 Ayer put the point exactly: “old diamonds are in ‘safe hands’ only when widely dispersed and held by individuals as cherished possessions valued far above their market price.” Harry Oppenheimer explained the logic in more measured language in the De Beers annual report for 1971. A degree of control was necessary, he wrote, not because production was excessive or demand falling, but because wide fluctuations in price, accepted as normal for most raw materials, “would be destructive of public confidence in the case of a pure luxury such as gem diamonds, of which large stocks are held in the form of jewelry by the general public.”[1]
By 1979, Epstein reported, Ayer had helped De Beers raise its wholesale diamond sales in the United States to more than 2.1 billion dollars a year, against twenty-three million in 1939, while advertising spending had grown from two hundred thousand dollars a year to ten million. But he also gathered evidence that private owners who tried to sell diamonds found it surprisingly hard. Among his examples were the London consumer magazine Money Which?, which bought diamonds in 1970 to test them as an investment, and the Dutch consumer association, which in 1976 bought a perfect stone of over a carat in Amsterdam, held it for eight months and then offered it to the twenty leading dealers in the city. Nineteen refused to buy it, and the twentieth offered only a fraction of the purchase price. Israel posed a different problem. Since the early 1970s, with prices rising and the Israeli currency falling, dealers in Tel Aviv had found it more profitable to keep the rough they received from London than to cut and sell it. In early 1977 Philip Oppenheimer sent his son Anthony to Tel Aviv with other De Beers executives to announce that Israel’s quota would be cut by at least a fifth. The warning, by Epstein’s account, had the opposite of its intended effect: Israeli dealers built up still larger stocks, and De Beers estimated that by 1977 they held more than six million carats. The cartel decided that it had no alternative but to force the liquidation of the Israeli stockpile.[1]
Two ways of seeing it
To its defenders, the Ayer campaign was one of the most successful pieces of advertising ever devised, and the diamond engagement ring a tradition that gave pleasure to millions and sustained producing countries and their workers. To its critics, Epstein foremost among them, it was a diamond invention: the manufacture of a sentiment in order to sustain the price of a commodity that would otherwise have been plentiful and cheap. Epstein’s article ended by predicting that new supplies from Australia might bring about the final collapse of the system. It did not collapse, though it changed beyond recognition in the decades that followed. Few families have shaped a private custom so widely, and few have been so frankly described by their own advertising agents as practising mass psychology on the public.[1]
References
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- Edward Jay Epstein, “Have You Ever Tried to Sell a Diamond?,” The Atlantic, February 1982 *
- “De Beers 2008,” News24, 3 November 2008 *
- The Marketing Society, “A tagline is forever,” 19 May 2014 *
The family tree, timeline, places, glossary and select bibliography for the whole history are on the Oppenheimer index page.